Preventive health care and payment systems

Pedro P. Barros, Xavier Martinez-Giralt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care. The analysis is performed through a series of examples combining different payment schemes at the primary care center and hospital. When hospitals are reimbursed according to costs, prevention efforts are unlikely to occur. However, under a capitation payment for the primary care center and prospective budget for the hospital, prevention efforts increase when shifting from an independent to an integrated management. Also, from a normative standpoint, optimal payment schemes are simpler under joint management.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)177-199
JournalTopics in Economic Analysis and Policy
Volume3
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2003

Keywords

  • Payment system
  • Preventive health care

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Preventive health care and payment systems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Barros, P. P., & Martinez-Giralt, X. (2003). Preventive health care and payment systems. Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, 3(1), 177-199. https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1115