Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores

Jean Marc Bonnisseau, Vincent Iehlé

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parameterized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parameterized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non-convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1-26
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume61
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2007

    Keywords

    • Balancedness
    • Cooperative game
    • Core
    • Parameterized game

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