Opting out in a war of attrition

Mercedes Adamuz

Opting out in a war of attrition

Mercedes Adamuz

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

This paper analyzes a War of Attrition where players enjoy private information about their outside opportunities. The main message is that uncertainty about the possibility that the opponent opts out increases the equilibrium probability of concession.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	3
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2005

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