Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file

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In a situation in which people who are required to fill in a tax-return coexist with tax-return-exempt people, we prove that the optimal audit policy leads to different tax compliance behavior, depending on the difficulty of detecting an evader who does not fill in a tax return, passing himself of as a non-taxpayer. Copyright ©1996 Eisevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)99-115
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 1996


  • Audit policy
  • Tax-return-exempt individuals


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