On the rule of k names

Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho

On the rule of k names

Salvador Barberà^*, Danilo Coelho

^*Corresponding author for this work

Institute of Applied Economic Research

Research output: Working paper

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Abstract

The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. Different variants of this method have been used since the distant past and are still used today in many countries and for different types of choices. After documenting this widespread use by means of actual examples, we provide a game theoretical analysis. We concentrate on the plausible outcomes induced by the rule of k names when the agents involved act strategically. Our analysis shows how the parameter k, the screening rule and the nature of candidacies act as a means to balance the power of the committee with that of the chooser.

Original language	English
Publisher	BSE Working Papers
Publication status	Published - 13 Mar 2007

Publication series

Name	BSE Working Papers
No.	264

Keywords

Constitutional design
Rule of three names
Screening candidates
Strong Nash equilibrium
Voting rules

Access to Document

https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/rule-k-namesLicence: C In Copyright

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Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, S. (Principal Investigator), Ayllon Aragon, G. (Scholar), Balart Castro, P. (Scholar), Caramuta ., D. (Scholar), Filippos , L. (Scholar), Gjorgjiev, R. (Scholar), Li , N. (Scholar), Merlino , L. P. (Scholar), Ozturk , T. (Scholar), Bervoets ., S. J. (Researcher on contract), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Researcher on contract), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigator), Brown, D. J. (Investigator), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigator), Coelho, D. (Investigator), Flamand ., S. (Investigator), Groenert ., V. (Investigator), Haeringer , G. (Investigator), Jackson, M. O. (Investigator), Massó, J. (Investigator), Miralles Asensio, A. (Investigator), Mukherjee ., S. (Investigator), Neme, A. (Investigator), Nicolo, A. (Investigator), Nozomu , M. (Investigator) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigator)
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
1/01/09 → 30/07/15
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

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title = "On the rule of k names",

abstract = "The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. Different variants of this method have been used since the distant past and are still used today in many countries and for different types of choices. After documenting this widespread use by means of actual examples, we provide a game theoretical analysis. We concentrate on the plausible outcomes induced by the rule of k names when the agents involved act strategically. Our analysis shows how the parameter k, the screening rule and the nature of candidacies act as a means to balance the power of the committee with that of the chooser.",

keywords = "Constitutional design, Rule of three names, Screening candidates, Strong Nash equilibrium, Voting rules",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Danilo Coelho",

note = "Salvador Barber{\`a} gratefully acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants Acciones Complementarias SEJ2006-27589-E and FEDER, and “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d{\textquoteright}Universitats, Recerca I Societat de la Informaci{\'o} through the Distinci{\'o} per a la Promoci{\'o} de la Recerca Universit{\`a}ria and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. Danilo Coelho acknowledges the financial support from Capes, Brazilian Ministry of Education.",

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N1 - Salvador Barberà gratefully acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants Acciones Complementarias SEJ2006-27589-E and FEDER, and “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d’Universitats, Recerca I Societat de la Informació through the Distinció per a la Promoció de la Recerca Universitària and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. Danilo Coelho acknowledges the financial support from Capes, Brazilian Ministry of Education.

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N2 - The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. Different variants of this method have been used since the distant past and are still used today in many countries and for different types of choices. After documenting this widespread use by means of actual examples, we provide a game theoretical analysis. We concentrate on the plausible outcomes induced by the rule of k names when the agents involved act strategically. Our analysis shows how the parameter k, the screening rule and the nature of candidacies act as a means to balance the power of the committee with that of the chooser.

AB - The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. Different variants of this method have been used since the distant past and are still used today in many countries and for different types of choices. After documenting this widespread use by means of actual examples, we provide a game theoretical analysis. We concentrate on the plausible outcomes induced by the rule of k names when the agents involved act strategically. Our analysis shows how the parameter k, the screening rule and the nature of candidacies act as a means to balance the power of the committee with that of the chooser.

KW - Constitutional design

KW - Rule of three names

KW - Screening candidates

KW - Strong Nash equilibrium

KW - Voting rules

M3 - Working paper

T3 - BSE Working Papers

BT - On the rule of k names

PB - BSE Working Papers

ER -

On the rule of k names

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Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO

Cite this