On the nucleolus of neighbor games

Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn, Tamás Solymosi, Stef Tijs, Dries Vermeulen

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Assignment problems are well-known problems in practice. We mention house markets, job markets, and production planning. The games of interest in this paper, the neighbor games, arise from a special class of assignment problems. We focus on the nucleolus [D. Schmeidler, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17 (1969) 1163-1170], one of the most prominent core solutions. A core solution is interesting with respect to neighbor games because it divides the profit of an optimal matching in a stable manner. This paper establishes a polynomial bounded algorithm of quadratic order in the number of players for calculating the nucleolus of neighbor games. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1-18
    JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
    Volume146
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2003

    Keywords

    • Assignment games
    • Game theory
    • Neighbor games
    • Nucleolus

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