On the manipulation of indirect elections

Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review


This paper is devoted to the analysis of two tiers voting rules. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction and next, an aggregation procedure collects the results from the jurisdictions in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, it is possible that they can manipulate the result of the election, except when the voting rule is the Priority rule, which assigns a priority order to the candidates.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)767-777
JournalRevue Economique
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2007


  • Classification JEL
  • D71
  • D72


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