On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

Ruth Martínez; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme; Jorge Oviedo

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms. © 2007 Springer Verlag.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	497-518
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	36
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2008

Keywords

Matching
Semilattice
Stability
Substitutable preferences

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Martínez, R., Massó, J., Neme, A., & Oviedo, J. (2008). On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles. International Journal of Game Theory, 36, 497-518. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7

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