On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms. © 2007 Springer Verlag.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)497-518
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume36
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2008

Keywords

  • Matching
  • Semilattice
  • Stability
  • Substitutable preferences

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