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Abstract
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 163-189 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | International Economic Review |
Volume | 59 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 28 Nov 2018 |
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Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones
Massó, J. (Principal Investigator), Barberà, S. (Collaborator), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigator), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigator), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigator), Miralles, A. (Investigator), Rodríguez Barraquer, T. (Investigator) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigator)
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO)
1/01/15 → 31/12/17
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants