On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness

Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Massó*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)


We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)163-189
Number of pages27
JournalInternational Economic Review
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2018


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