On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

Jordi Massó, Inés Moreno de Barreda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)467-484
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume72
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2011

Keywords

  • Feasibility constraints
  • Median voter
  • Single-peaked preferences
  • Strategy-proofness

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