TY - JOUR
T1 - On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
AU - Massó, Jordi
AU - Moreno de Barreda, Inés
PY - 2011/6/1
Y1 - 2011/6/1
N2 - We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
AB - We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
KW - Feasibility constraints
KW - Median voter
KW - Single-peaked preferences
KW - Strategy-proofness
UR - https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143785
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
M3 - Article
VL - 72
SP - 467
EP - 484
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
ER -