On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

Agustín G. Bonifacio; Jordi Massó

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	219-238
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	124
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005
Publication status	Published - Nov 2020

Keywords

Strategy-proofness
Unanimity
Anonymity
Tops-onlyness
Single-peakedness

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10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005Licence: C In Copyright

Elección social, redes y bienestar: teoría y aplicaciones
Massó, J., Barberà, S., Miralles, A., Sancho Pifarre, F., Vila Carnicero, F. J., Guerra, A. I., Milán, P. & Mevsim , D.
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MICINN)
1/01/18 → 30/09/21
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

@article{be255afb7be743b8906455f05198eeb9,

title = "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness",

abstract = "We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.",

keywords = "Strategy-proofness, Unanimity, Anonymity, Tops-onlyness, Single-peakedness",

author = "Bonifacio, {Agust{\'i}n G.} and Jordi Mass{\'o}",

note = "Bonifacio acknowledges financial support received from the UNSL, through grant 032016, from the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient{\'i}ficas y T{\'e}cnicas (CONICET), through grant PIP 112-201501-005055, and from the Agencia Nacional de Promoci{\'o}n Cient{\'i}fica y Tecnol{\'o}gica, through grant PICT 2017-2355. Mass{\'o} and Bonifacio acknowledge financial support received from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through grant ECO2017-83534-P. Mass{\'o} acknowledges financial support received from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S) and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant SGR2017-711.",

year = "2020",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005",

language = "English",

volume = "124",

pages = "219--238",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

AU - Bonifacio, Agustín G.

AU - Massó, Jordi

N1 - Bonifacio acknowledges financial support received from the UNSL, through grant 032016, from the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), through grant PIP 112-201501-005055, and from the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica, through grant PICT 2017-2355. Massó and Bonifacio acknowledge financial support received from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through grant ECO2017-83534-P. Massó acknowledges financial support received from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S) and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant SGR2017-711.

PY - 2020/11

Y1 - 2020/11

N2 - We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.

AB - We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.

KW - Strategy-proofness

KW - Unanimity

KW - Anonymity

KW - Tops-onlyness

KW - Single-peakedness

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 124

SP - 219

EP - 238

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

Abstract

Keywords

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Elección social, redes y bienestar: teoría y aplicaciones

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