4 Citations (Scopus)


We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-238
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2020


  • Strategy-proofness
  • Unanimity
  • Anonymity
  • Tops-onlyness
  • Single-peakedness


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