TY - JOUR
T1 - On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
AU - Bergantiños, Gustavo
AU - Massó, Jordi
AU - Neme, Alejandro
PY - 2017/4/1
Y1 - 2017/4/1
N2 - © 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
AB - © 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
M3 - Article
VL - 48
SP - 857
EP - 875
ER -