On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness

Jordi Massó; Gustavo Bergantiños; Alejandro Neme

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness

Jordi Massó, Gustavo Bergantiños, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	857-875
Number of pages	19
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	48
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
Publication status	Published - 1 Apr 2017

Access to Document

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/182480Licence: C In Copyright

Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones
Massó, J., Barberà, S., Ballester Oyarzun, M. A., Beviá Baeza, M. D. C., Calsamiglia Costa, C., Miralles, A., Vila Carnicero, F. J. & Rodríguez Barraquer, T.
1/01/15 → 31/12/17
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

@article{fcc93861b2ca424188589d78e6ac6b92,

title = "On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness",

abstract = "We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.",

author = "Jordi Mass{\'o} and Gustavo Berganti{\~n}os and Alejandro Neme",

note = "The work of G. Berganti{\~n}os is partially supported by research Grants ECO2014-52616-R from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Competitiveness, GRC 2015/014 from “Xunta de Galicia”, and 19320/PI/14 from “ Fundaci {\'o}n S{\'e}neca de la Regi{\'o}n de Murcia”. J. Mass{\'o} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Grant ECO2014-53051, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through Grant SGR2014-515. The paper was partly written while J. Mass{\'o} was visiting the Department of Economics at Stanford University; he wishes to acknowledge its hospitality as well as financial support from the Ministerio de Educaci{\'o}n, Cultura y Deporte through project PR2015-00408. The work of A. Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis, through Grant 319502, and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient{\'i}ficas y T{\'e}cnicas (CONICET), through Grant PIP 112-200801-00655.",

year = "2017",

month = apr,

day = "1",

doi = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0",

language = "English",

volume = "48",

pages = "857--875",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness

AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Bergantiños, Gustavo

AU - Neme, Alejandro

N1 - The work of G. Bergantiños is partially supported by research Grants ECO2014-52616-R from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Competitiveness, GRC 2015/014 from “Xunta de Galicia”, and 19320/PI/14 from “ Fundaci ón Séneca de la Región de Murcia”. J. Massó acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Grant ECO2014-53051, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through Grant SGR2014-515. The paper was partly written while J. Massó was visiting the Department of Economics at Stanford University; he wishes to acknowledge its hospitality as well as financial support from the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte through project PR2015-00408. The work of A. Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis, through Grant 319502, and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), through Grant PIP 112-200801-00655.

PY - 2017/4/1

Y1 - 2017/4/1

N2 - We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.

AB - We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0

DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0

M3 - Article

SN - 0176-1714

VL - 48

SP - 857

EP - 875

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

IS - 4

ER -

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Projects

Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones

Cite this