On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness

Gustavo Bergantiños; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme

doi:10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

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Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	857-875
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	48
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1041-0
Publication status	Published - 1 Apr 2017

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https://ddd.uab.cat/record/182480Licence: C In Copyright

Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones
Massó, J. (Principal Investigator), Barberà, S. (Collaborator), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigator), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigator), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigator), Miralles, A. (Investigator), Rodríguez Barraquer, T. (Investigator) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigator)
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO)
1/01/15 → 31/12/17
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

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On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: Strategy-proofness

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Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones

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