On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships:: internal stability and consistency

Jordi Massó; Gustavo Bergantiños; Alejandro Neme

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9644-6

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

Jordi Massó, Gustavo Bergantiños, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	83-97
Number of pages	15
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	84
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9644-6
Publication status	Published - 4 Dec 2017

Keywords

Anonymity
Consistency
Efficiency
Internal stability
Neutrality

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9644-6

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/182575

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Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones
Masso Carreras, J., Barbera Sandez, S., Ballester Oyarzun, M. A., Beviá Baeza, M. D. C., Calsamiglia Costa, C., Miralles Asensio, A., Vila Carnicero, F. J. & Rodríguez Barraquer, T.
1/01/15 → 31/12/17
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

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title = "On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships:: internal stability and consistency",

abstract = "We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.",

keywords = "Anonymity, Consistency, Efficiency, Internal stability, Neutrality",

author = "Jordi Mass{\'o} and Gustavo Berganti{\~n}os and Alejandro Neme",

note = "The work of G. Berganti{\~n}os is partially supported by research grants ECO2014-52616-R from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Competitiveness, GRC 2015/014 from ”Xunta de Galicia”, and 19320/PI/14 from “Fundaci{\'o}n S{\'e}neca de la Regi{\'o}n de Murcia”. J. Mass{\'o} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grant ECO2014-53051, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant SGR2014-515. The paper was partly written while J. Mass{\'o} was visiting the Department of Economics at Stanford University; he wishes to acknowledge its hospitality as well as financial support from the Ministerio de Educaci{\'o}n, Cultura y Deporte through project PR2015-00408. The work of A. Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis, through grant 319502, and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient{\'i}ficas y T{\'e}cnicas (CONICET), through grant PIP 112-200801-00655. ",

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AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Bergantiños, Gustavo

AU - Neme, Alejandro

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KW - Anonymity

KW - Consistency

KW - Efficiency

KW - Internal stability

KW - Neutrality

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On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

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Keywords

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Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones

Cite this