On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

Jordi Massó, Gustavo Bergantiños, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)83-97
Number of pages15
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume84
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Dec 2017

Keywords

  • Anonymity
  • Consistency
  • Efficiency
  • Internal stability
  • Neutrality

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this