On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

© 2017, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)83-97
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume84
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2018

Keywords

  • Anonymity
  • Consistency
  • Efficiency
  • Internal stability
  • Neutrality

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