On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)


For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. Therefore, in centralized markets like entry-level professional labor markets if the proposed matching is the workers-optimal stable matching then, no group of workers can never benefit by reporting untruthfully their preference relations. We exhibit an example showing that this property fails if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)115-128
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2004


  • Matching
  • Stability
  • Strategy-proofness


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