On exiting after voting

D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, J. Massó, A. Neme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit behavior of members after knowing the chosen alternative. For the case of monotonic preferences we propose, for each chosen alternative, an unambiguous and meaningful prediction of the subset of members that will exit.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)33-54
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume34
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2006

Keywords

  • Exit
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • Voting

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