Notes on a new compromise value: The <inf>x</inf>-value

G. Bergantiños; J. Massó

doi:10.1080/02331939608844254

Notes on a new compromise value: The <inf>x</inf>-value

G. Bergantiños, J. Massó

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce and study a new compromise value for all weakly essential transferable utility games: the x-value. It is closely related to the τ-value defined by Tijs in 1981. The main difference being the way we define the maximal aspiration a player may have in the game: instead of considering the marginal contribution to the grand coalition, we consider his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution. We show that the class of games where the new value can be applied is larger.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	277-286
Journal	Optimization
Volume	38
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/02331939608844254
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1996

Keywords

Compromise value
Games
Marginal contributions
TU-games

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Bergantiños, G., & Massó, J. (1996). Notes on a new compromise value: The <inf>x</inf>-value. Optimization, 38(3), 277-286. https://doi.org/10.1080/02331939608844254

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