Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

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    1 Citation (Scopus)


    © 2017 Elsevier Inc. We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)222-229
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2017


    • Implementation
    • Matching
    • Mechanisms
    • Stability
    • Substitutability


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