Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes

Salvador Barberà; Jordi Massò; Alejandro Neme

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146

Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes

Salvador Barberà, Jordi Massò, Alejandro Neme

Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	321-336
Number of pages	16
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	16
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146
Publication status	Published - 1999

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142706

Cooperació i Competència: Estudis sobre el comportament estratègic i el disseny institucional
Barberà, S., Caballero Jurado, J., Villar Febré, J. P., Beviá Baeza, M. D. C., Cardona Coll, D., Gonzalez Maestre, M., Jelovac ., I., Macho Stadler, I., Martínez Giralt, X., Massó, J., Olivella, P., Perez Castrillo, J. D., Ponsati Obiols, C., Vila Carnicero, F. J., Berga Colom, D. & Bogomolnaia, A.
15/12/97 → 15/12/99
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

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title = "Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes",

abstract = "We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Jordi Mass{\`o} and Alejandro Neme",

note = "Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperaci{\'o}n Cient{\'i}fica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of S. Barber{\`a} and J. Masso is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Direcci{\'o}n General de Investigaci{\'o}n Cient{\'i}fica y T{\'e}cnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR96-75 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalit{\"a}t de Catalunya.",

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doi = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146",

language = "English",

volume = "16",

pages = "321--336",

number = "2",

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T1 - Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes

AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Massò, Jordi

AU - Neme, Alejandro

N1 - Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperación Científica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of S. Barberà and J. Masso is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR96-75 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalität de Catalunya.

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.

AB - We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146

DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146

M3 - Article

VL - 16

SP - 321

EP - 336

IS - 2

ER -

Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes

Abstract

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Cooperació i Competència: Estudis sobre el comportament estratègic i el disseny institucional

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