Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem

Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme

doi:10.1006/game.2001.0850

Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem

Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. © 2001 Academic Press.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	367-387
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	37
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0850
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2001

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AB - The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. © 2001 Academic Press.

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Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem

Abstract

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