Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods

Carmen Beviá

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we study the strategic aspects of the No-Envy solution for the problem of allocating a finite set of indivisible goods among a group of agents when monetary compensations are possible. In the first part of the paper we consider the case where each agent receives, at most, one indivisible good. We prove that the set of equilibrium allocations of any direct revelation game associated with a subsolution of the No-Envy solution coincides with the set of envy-free allocations for the true preferences. Under manipulation all the subsolutions of the No-Envy solution are equivalent. In the second part of the paper, we allow each agent to receive more than one indivisible good. In this situation the above characterization does not hold any more. We prove that any Equal Income Walrasian allocation for the true preferences can be supported as an equilibrium allocation of any direct revelation game associated with subsolutions of the No-Envy solution, but also non-efficient allocations can be supported. © Springer-Verlag 2009.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)209-222
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume39
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2010

Keywords

  • Direct revelation games
  • Envy-freeness
  • Indivisible goods

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this