Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation

Salvador Barberà; Carmen Beviá

Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation

Research output: Working paper

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Abstract

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that: (1) these decisions are Condorcet winners whenever one exists, (2) the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location, and (3) no agent wishes to become a user of another facility, even if that could induce a change of its present location by majority voting.

Original language	English
Publisher	BSE Working Papers
Number of pages	30
Publication status	Published - Mar 2004

Publication series

Name	BSE Working Papers
No.	128

Keywords

Condorcet rules
Consistency
Group formation
Simpson rule
Social choice correspondences
Stability

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https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/locating-public-facilities-majority-stability-consistency-and-groupLicence: C In Copyright

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Desarrollo del programa de actividad investigadora del equipo beneficiario "HI2001-0039" del progama CONSOLIDER
Martínez Giralt, X. (Principal Investigator), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigator), Barbe Duran, L. (Investigator), Barberà, S. (Investigator), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigator), Caballé, J. (Investigator), Cabeza Gutes, M. T. (Investigator), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigator), Casals Couturier, M. (Investigator), Conesa Roca, J. C. (Investigator), Creel , M. D. (Investigator), Dolado, Juan José (Investigator), Farell Ferrer, M. (Investigator), Gambetti , L. (Investigator), Gnocchi , S. (Investigator), Haeringer , G. (Investigator), Iorio , D. (Investigator), Macho Stadler, I. (Investigator), Martinez Legaz, J. E. (Investigator), Massó, J. (Investigator), Obiols, F. (Investigator), Olivella, P. (Investigator), Panadès Martí, J. (Investigator), Perez Castrillo, J. D. (Investigator), Polo Andres, J. C. (Investigator), Raymond Bara, J. L. (Investigator), Rey Biel, P. (Investigator), Rodríguez Planas, N. (Investigator), Sancho, F. (Investigator), Sorolla Amat, V. (Investigator), Suárez-Lledó Grande, J. (Investigator), Trento , S. (Investigator), Trillas Jane, F. A. (Investigator) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigator)
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
15/09/06 → 15/09/11
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants
"Groups, networks and coalitions in collective decision-making"
Massó, J. (Principal Investigator), Barberà, S. (Principal Investigator 2), Calvó Armengol, A. (Researcher on contract), Haeringer , G. (Researcher on contract), Klaus ., B.-E. (Researcher on contract), Klijn , F. (Researcher on contract), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigator), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigator), Dutta, B. (Investigator), Jackson, M. (Investigator), Neme, A. J. (Investigator) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigator)
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCYT)
1/12/02 → 1/12/05
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

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title = "Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation",

abstract = "We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that: (1) these decisions are Condorcet winners whenever one exists, (2) the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location, and (3) no agent wishes to become a user of another facility, even if that could induce a change of its present location by majority voting. ",

keywords = "Condorcet rules, Consistency, Group formation, Simpson rule, Social choice correspondences, Stability",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Carmen Bevi{\'a}",

note = "We thank Matthew Jackson, Jean-Francois Laslier, Herv{\'e} Moulin, John Weymark and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. We thank the support of the Barcelona Economics program (CREA). ",

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language = "English",

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number = "128",

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AU - Beviá, Carmen

N1 - We thank Matthew Jackson, Jean-Francois Laslier, Hervé Moulin, John Weymark and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. We thank the support of the Barcelona Economics program (CREA).

PY - 2004/3

Y1 - 2004/3

N2 - We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that: (1) these decisions are Condorcet winners whenever one exists, (2) the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location, and (3) no agent wishes to become a user of another facility, even if that could induce a change of its present location by majority voting.

AB - We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that: (1) these decisions are Condorcet winners whenever one exists, (2) the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location, and (3) no agent wishes to become a user of another facility, even if that could induce a change of its present location by majority voting.

KW - Condorcet rules

KW - Consistency

KW - Group formation

KW - Simpson rule

KW - Social choice correspondences

KW - Stability

M3 - Working paper

T3 - BSE Working Papers

BT - Locating public facilities by majority

PB - BSE Working Papers

ER -

Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

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Projects

Desarrollo del programa de actividad investigadora del equipo beneficiario "HI2001-0039" del progama CONSOLIDER

"Groups, networks and coalitions in collective decision-making"

Cite this