Intertemporal transfer institutions

Joan Maria Esteban, József Sákovics

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    19 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider a single commodity overlapping generations model where, at a cost, institutions can be created (or transformed) to carry out intergenerational transfers. We analyze the game with both strategic and cooperative methods, characterizing the "unique" stationary equilibrium, as well as the set of transfer institutions that belong to the core (which we show to coincide with the consistent core). We conclude that, as long as the creation of an institution is costly, it is possible to sustain positive transfers, though those will be below the optimal level. Moreover, the lower the costs, the more efficient the transfer will be. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D23, E21, H55. © 1993 by Academic Press, Inc.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)189-205
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume61
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1993

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Intertemporal transfer institutions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this