Instability in the labor market for researchers

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

R&D is both an activity which involves team effort, and with many of the features of a zero-sum game. This paper shows that these characteristics make the labor market for researchers unstable in the sense that firms have incentives to continuously change the composition of their research teams. Related results concerning the core of several cooperative games in characteristic form are also proved. Copyright ©1996 Eisevier Science E.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)263-281
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume2
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 1996

Keywords

  • Core
  • Labor market
  • R&d
  • Stability

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Instability in the labor market for researchers'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this