TY - JOUR
T1 - Innovative behavioral regulatory agencies as second generation commitment devices
AU - Trillas, Francesc
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - © 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This article analyzes how the commitment problem in economic regulation, and a solution based on strategic delegation, are affected by the non-standard rationality of agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. As a result, on the one hand, independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust innovative regulatory system, and, on the other hand, their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments. Second generation commitment mechanisms that take this into account may be a key ingredient of reforms in the regulation of those industries that require a long run perspective.
AB - © 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This article analyzes how the commitment problem in economic regulation, and a solution based on strategic delegation, are affected by the non-standard rationality of agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. As a result, on the one hand, independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust innovative regulatory system, and, on the other hand, their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments. Second generation commitment mechanisms that take this into account may be a key ingredient of reforms in the regulation of those industries that require a long run perspective.
KW - Behavioral economics
KW - commitment
KW - delegation
KW - regulation
U2 - 10.1080/17487870.2019.1609358
DO - 10.1080/17487870.2019.1609358
M3 - Article
JO - Journal of Economic Policy Reform
JF - Journal of Economic Policy Reform
SN - 1748-7870
ER -