Innovative behavioral regulatory agencies as second generation commitment devices

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© 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This article analyzes how the commitment problem in economic regulation, and a solution based on strategic delegation, are affected by the non-standard rationality of agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. As a result, on the one hand, independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust innovative regulatory system, and, on the other hand, their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments. Second generation commitment mechanisms that take this into account may be a key ingredient of reforms in the regulation of those industries that require a long run perspective.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Economic Policy Reform
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2019


  • Behavioral economics
  • commitment
  • delegation
  • regulation


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