Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

41 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1648-1674
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume145
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2010

Keywords

  • Group strategy-proofness
  • Separable preferences
  • Sequential inclusion
  • Single-peaked preferences
  • Strategy-proofness

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