Incentives and manipulability in Choice Modeling. Some experimental results

Pere Riera, Olga Lucia Manrique

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

From a mechanism design perspective, a valuation exercise can be analyzed in terms of its incentive compatibility. However, a non-incentive compatible exercise does not automatically imply that participants will engage in strategic behavior. The likelihood of this behavior can be tested through lab experiments. In this regard, choice modeling has received little attention compared to the contingent valuation method. This article reports a laboratory experiment using contingent grouping, a choice modeling valuation variant. The main conclusion is that the manipulability of this type of valuation exercises may be too difficult to realize by the participants to behave strategically - unless they are made aware in advance.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-207
JournalRevue d'Economie Politique
Volume125
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

Keywords

  • Choice experiment
  • Contingent grouping
  • Contingent valuation
  • Incentive compatibility

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