Incentive regulation and the role of convexity in benchmarking electricity distribution: Economists versus engineers

Emili Grifell-Tatjé, Kristiaan Kerstens

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This note illustrates the potential impact of the specification of a convex production technology on establishing minimal costs compared to the use of a non-convex technology when benchmarking electricity distributors. This methodological reflection is mainly motivated by recent engineering literature providing evidence for non-convexities in electricity distribution. An empirical illustration using non-parametric specifications of technology illustrates this main point using a sample of Spanish electricity distribution firms earlier analysed in © 2008 The Authors Journal compilation © CIRIEC 2008.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)227-248
    JournalAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics
    Volume79
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2008

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Incentive regulation and the role of convexity in benchmarking electricity distribution: Economists versus engineers'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this