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Incentive contracts and peer effects in the workplace
P. Milán
, Nicolás Oviedo-Dávila
Department of Economics and Economic History
Center for the study of the Organizations and Decisions in Economics (CODE)
Institutional design: theory and applications
Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)
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Working paper
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Keyphrases
Workplace
100%
Peer Effects
100%
Firm Profits
100%
Incentive Contract
100%
Contract Effect
100%
Rent
50%
Cant
50%
Network Structure
50%
Spectral Properties
50%
Group Composition
50%
Linear Contracts
50%
Risk-averse
50%
Within-group Differences
50%
Optimal Incentives
50%
Wage Contract
50%
Joint Output
50%
Connected Worker
50%
Via Chain
50%
Modular Production
50%
Worker Incentives
50%
Productivity Spillovers
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Incentives
100%
Peer Effect
100%
Spillover Effect
25%
Labor Contract
25%