Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón, Simon Wilkie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games. © Springer-Verlag 2003.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)429-442
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2003

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