Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms

David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose two simple mechanisms that implement two bargaining sets in super-additive environments. The first bargaining set is a close variation of the one proposed by L. Zhou (1994, Games Econom. Behav.6, 512-526), and the second is the Pareto optimum payoffs of the A. Mas-Colell (1989, J. Math. Econom.18, 129-139) bargaining set. We adopt a simple framework in which the cooperative outcomes are realized as non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies of a two-stage game played by an auxiliary set of individuals competing over the cooperative agents. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72. © 2000 Academic Press.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)106-120
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume31
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2000

Keywords

  • Bargaining set
  • Implementation
  • Simple mechanism

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this