How strategy sensitive are contributions? A test of six hypotheses in a two-person dilemma game

Gary E. Bolton; Jordi Brandts; Elena Katok

doi:10.1007/s001990050018

How strategy sensitive are contributions? A test of six hypotheses in a two-person dilemma game

Gary E. Bolton, Jordi Brandts, Elena Katok

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We test six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games, a category that includes the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. Our experiment focuses specifically on the strategic interdependence of contributing behavior, and manipulates the strategy space of a two-person dilemma game especially designed for the task. The hypothesis that contributors have non-linear preferences over own and the other player's payoffs accurately matches the strategic pattern of contributing that we observe across treatments. None of the reasons for contributing advanced by the other hypotheses, whether alone or in additive combination, does so.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	367-387
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	15
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050018
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2000

Keywords

Dilemma games
Experimental economics
Motivations

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