How strategy sensitive are contributions? A test of six hypotheses in a two-person dilemma game

Gary E. Bolton, Jordi Brandts, Elena Katok

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We test six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games, a category that includes the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. Our experiment focuses specifically on the strategic interdependence of contributing behavior, and manipulates the strategy space of a two-person dilemma game especially designed for the task. The hypothesis that contributors have non-linear preferences over own and the other player's payoffs accurately matches the strategic pattern of contributing that we observe across treatments. None of the reasons for contributing advanced by the other hypotheses, whether alone or in additive combination, does so.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)367-387
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume15
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2000

Keywords

  • Dilemma games
  • Experimental economics
  • Motivations

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