Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions

Pierre Courtois; Tarik Tazdaït

doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015

Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions

Pierre Courtois, Tarik Tazdaït

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic climate change decision-making taking into account influential processes occurring during negotiation rounds. Imitation, persuasion and dissuasion are considered. To represent negotiation outcomes, we define a stochastic model derived from concepts of thermodynamics. We use the master equation to describe games of influence. We illustrate the model by simulating the formation and the evolution of a cooperative coalition in the course of a negotiation round. We derive conditions for the emergence and the enlargement of a cooperative agreement. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	301-314
Journal	Ecological Modelling
Volume	204
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015
Publication status	Published - 16 Jun 2007

Keywords

Climate change negotiation
Games of influence
Integrated assessment modelling
Master equation

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015

Cite this

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AB - We present an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic climate change decision-making taking into account influential processes occurring during negotiation rounds. Imitation, persuasion and dissuasion are considered. To represent negotiation outcomes, we define a stochastic model derived from concepts of thermodynamics. We use the master equation to describe games of influence. We illustrate the model by simulating the formation and the evolution of a cooperative coalition in the course of a negotiation round. We derive conditions for the emergence and the enlargement of a cooperative agreement. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Climate change negotiation

KW - Games of influence

KW - Integrated assessment modelling

KW - Master equation

U2 - 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015

DO - 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015

M3 - Article

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SP - 301

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JO - Ecological Modelling

JF - Ecological Modelling

SN - 0304-3800

IS - 3-4

ER -

Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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