Fraction-Like ratings from preferential voting

Rosa Camps; Xavier Mora; Laia Saumell

doi:https://doi.org/10.5565/PUBLMAT_59115_06

Fraction-Like ratings from preferential voting

Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, Laia Saumell

Department of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

A method is given for resolving a matrix of preference scores into a well-specified mixture of options. This is done in agreement with several desirable properties, including the continuity of the mixing proportions with respect to the preference scores and a condition of compatibility with the Condorcet-Smith majority principle. These properties are achieved by combining the classical rating method of Zermelo with a projection procedure introduced in previous papers of the same authors.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	99-136
Journal	Publicacions Matematiques
Volume	59
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5565/PUBLMAT_59115_06
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2015

Keywords

Clone consistency
Condorcet-Smith principle
Continuous rating
Luce's choice model
Majority principles
One-Dimensional scaling
Paired comparisons
Preferential voting
Zermelo's method of strengths

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KW - Clone consistency

KW - Condorcet-Smith principle

KW - Continuous rating

KW - Luce's choice model

KW - Majority principles

KW - One-Dimensional scaling

KW - Paired comparisons

KW - Preferential voting

KW - Zermelo's method of strengths

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Fraction-Like ratings from preferential voting

Abstract

Keywords

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