Forming efficient networks

David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.005

Forming efficient networks

David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	83-87
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	87
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.005
Publication status	Published - 1 Apr 2005

Keywords

Implementation
Networks
Shapley value

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Cite this

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title = "Forming efficient networks",

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AU - Wettstein, David

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AB - We suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Implementation

KW - Networks

KW - Shapley value

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.005

DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.005

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EP - 87

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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