Fast charging stations: Simulating entry and location in a game of strategic interaction

Valeria Bernardo, Joan Ramon Borrell, Jordi Perdiguero

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. This paper uses a game of strategic interaction to simulate entry and location of fast charging stations for electric vehicles. It evaluates the equilibria obtained in terms of social welfare and firm spatial differentiation. Using Barcelona mobility survey, demographic data and the street graph we find that only at an electric vehicle penetration rate above 3% does a dense network of stations appear as the equilibrium outcome of a market with no fiscal transfers. We also find that price competition drives location differentiation measured not only in Euclidean distances but also in consumer travel distances.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)293-305
JournalEnergy Economics
Volume60
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2016

Keywords

  • Electric vehicle
  • Entry models
  • Fast charging
  • Games of strategic interaction
  • Regional planning

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