Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

Carmen Beviá

doi:10.1007/s100580050013

Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

Carmen Beviá

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped. © Springer-Verlag 1998.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	195-213
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	3
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050013
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1998

Keywords

Consistency
Envy-free
Indivisible goods

Access to Document

10.1007/s100580050013

Cite this

@article{17d084f1b5e7460590404fd93de88a55,

title = "Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods",

abstract = "In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped. {\textcopyright} Springer-Verlag 1998.",

keywords = "Consistency, Envy-free, Indivisible goods",

author = "Carmen Bevi{\'a}",

year = "1998",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/s100580050013",

language = "English",

volume = "3",

pages = "195--213",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

AU - Beviá, Carmen

PY - 1998/1/1

Y1 - 1998/1/1

N2 - In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped. © Springer-Verlag 1998.

AB - In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped. © Springer-Verlag 1998.

KW - Consistency

KW - Envy-free

KW - Indivisible goods

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/54649084046

U2 - 10.1007/s100580050013

DO - 10.1007/s100580050013

M3 - Article

SN - 1434-4742

VL - 3

SP - 195

EP - 213

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

IS - 3

ER -

Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this