Extending Xu's results to arrow's impossibility theorem

Herrade Igersheim

Extending Xu's results to arrow's impossibility theorem

Herrade Igersheim

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	4
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2005

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title = "Extending Xu's results to arrow's impossibility theorem",

abstract = "This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.",

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year = "2005",

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PY - 2005/12/1

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N2 - This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

AB - This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

M3 - Article

VL - 4

JO - Economics Bulletin

JF - Economics Bulletin

SN - 1545-2921

IS - 1

ER -

Extending Xu's results to arrow's impossibility theorem

Abstract

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