Abstract
© 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. We focus attention on assignment problems that must respect object-invariant (or uniform) weak priorities such as seniority rights in student residence assignment. We propose the sequential pseudomarket mechanism: the set of agents is partitioned into ordered priority groups that are called in turns to participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. SP is characterized by the concept of consistent weak ex-ante efficiency (CWEE), that is, weak ex-ante efficiency complemented by consistency to economy reduction. Moreover, it is shown that CWEE generically implies ex-ante efficiency.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 33-48 |
Journal | Review of Economic Design |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2017 |
Keywords
- Consistency
- Ex-ante efficiency
- Random assignment
- Sequential pseudomarket