Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights

Antonio Miralles

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


© 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. We focus attention on assignment problems that must respect object-invariant (or uniform) weak priorities such as seniority rights in student residence assignment. We propose the sequential pseudomarket mechanism: the set of agents is partitioned into ordered priority groups that are called in turns to participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. SP is characterized by the concept of consistent weak ex-ante efficiency (CWEE), that is, weak ex-ante efficiency complemented by consistency to economy reduction. Moreover, it is shown that CWEE generically implies ex-ante efficiency.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)33-48
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2017


  • Consistency
  • Ex-ante efficiency
  • Random assignment
  • Sequential pseudomarket


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