Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights

Antonio Miralles

doi:10.1007/s10058-016-0196-y

Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights

Antonio Miralles

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

© 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. We focus attention on assignment problems that must respect object-invariant (or uniform) weak priorities such as seniority rights in student residence assignment. We propose the sequential pseudomarket mechanism: the set of agents is partitioned into ordered priority groups that are called in turns to participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. SP is characterized by the concept of consistent weak ex-ante efficiency (CWEE), that is, weak ex-ante efficiency complemented by consistency to economy reduction. Moreover, it is shown that CWEE generically implies ex-ante efficiency.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	33-48
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	21
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0196-y
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2017

Keywords

Consistency
Ex-ante efficiency
Random assignment
Sequential pseudomarket

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AB - © 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. We focus attention on assignment problems that must respect object-invariant (or uniform) weak priorities such as seniority rights in student residence assignment. We propose the sequential pseudomarket mechanism: the set of agents is partitioned into ordered priority groups that are called in turns to participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. SP is characterized by the concept of consistent weak ex-ante efficiency (CWEE), that is, weak ex-ante efficiency complemented by consistency to economy reduction. Moreover, it is shown that CWEE generically implies ex-ante efficiency.

KW - Consistency

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KW - Random assignment

KW - Sequential pseudomarket

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