Evaluating the regulator: Winners and losers in the regulation of Spanish electricity distribution

Leticia Blázquez-Gómez, Emili Grifell-Tatjé

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    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The principal aim of this study is to evaluate the regulation of electricity distribution in Spain. To this end, we begin by analyzing whether the changes introduced by the regulator led distribution companies to improve their efficiency; we then address whether the reimbursements paid to the distribution companies are linked to efficiency; lastly, we examine whether consumers benefited from the efficiency improvements. We focus on Spain because the electricity regulator in that country is a longstanding pioneer in the implementation of incentive-based regulatory models. Our analysis was implemented using the regulatory model proposed by Bogetoft (1997) as a benchmark. The results show that the Spanish electricity regulator did not establish a link between efficiency and the reimbursements paid to electricity companies; in addition, the electricity companies benefited to the detriment of consumers. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)807-815
    JournalEnergy Economics
    Volume33
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2011

    Keywords

    • Efficiency analysis
    • Regulation by incentives
    • Spanish electricity distribution
    • Yardstick competition

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