Abstract
This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects′ behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 215. © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 36-63 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 1995 |