Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play

Jordi Brandts, W. Bentley Macleod

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

43 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects′ behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 215. © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)36-63
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1995

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