Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play

Jordi Brandts; W. Bentley Macleod

doi:10.1006/game.1995.1040

Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play

Jordi Brandts, W. Bentley Macleod

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

43 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects′ behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 215. © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	36-63
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	11
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1040
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1995

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