Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

Geoffroy de Clippel; David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

Geoffroy de Clippel, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. © 2011.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	413-423
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	75
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2012

Keywords

Asymmetric information
Egalitarian equivalence
Pareto efficiency

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10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/171305

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N2 - We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. © 2011.

AB - We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. © 2011.

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KW - Pareto efficiency

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Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

Abstract

Keywords

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