Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

Geoffroy de Clippel, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review


We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. © 2011.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)413-423
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2012


  • Asymmetric information
  • Egalitarian equivalence
  • Pareto efficiency


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