Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)591-611
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume64
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2008

Keywords

  • Gregarious preferences
  • Public goods
  • Subgame perfect implementation

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