Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: A characterization for the two alternatives case

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno

Research output: Chapter in BookChapterResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate the role of domain restrictions in allowing for the construction of satisfactory mechanisms in the case of interdependent types, when society can only choose one out of two alternatives. We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of non-constant ex post (or even interim) incentive-compatible and respectful mechanisms is that they are defined on domains that are not knit.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSocial Design
Subtitle of host publicationEssays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz
EditorsW. Trockel
Place of PublicationHeidelberg
Pages295-306
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-93809-7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Publication series

NameStudies in Economic Design (DESI)
ISSN (Print)2510-3970
ISSN (Electronic)2510-3989

Keywords

  • Mechanisms
  • Ex post incentive compatibility
  • Respectfulness
  • Knit domains

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