Deciding on what to Decide

Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)37-61
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume63
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2022

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