Deciding on what to decide

Salvador Barberà; Anke Gerber

doi:10.1111/iere.12542

Deciding on what to decide

Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

University of Hamburg (UHH)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

3 Citations (Web of Science)

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Abstract

We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	37-61
Number of pages	25
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	63
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12542
Publication status	Published - 8 Feb 2022

Keywords

Enogenous agenda formation
Model

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10.1111/iere.12542Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/283864

Cite this

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title = "Deciding on what to decide",

abstract = "We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.",

keywords = "Enogenous agenda formation, Model",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Anke Gerber",

note = "Salvador Barber{\`a} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigaci{\'o}n (AEI), throughthe Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and (SEV-2011-0075), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grants ECO2017-83534-P and PID2020-116771GB-I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, throughgrant 2017SGR—0711. Anke Gerber acknowledges financial support by MOVE for a research stay at the Universitat Aut{\`o}noma de Barcelona.",

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doi = "10.1111/iere.12542",

language = "English",

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AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Gerber, Anke

N1 - Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), throughthe Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and (SEV-2011-0075), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grants ECO2017-83534-P and PID2020-116771GB-I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, throughgrant 2017SGR—0711. Anke Gerber acknowledges financial support by MOVE for a research stay at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

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N2 - We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.

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KW - Model

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Deciding on what to decide

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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

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Deciding on what to decide

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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

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