Deception in Sender–Receiver Games

Manolo Martínez

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)215-227
    JournalErkenntnis
    Volume80
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014

    Keywords

    • Deception
    • Godfrey-Smith
    • Sender–receiver games
    • Skyrms

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