Deception in Sender–Receiver Games

Manolo Martínez

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9623-z

Deception in Sender–Receiver Games

Manolo Martínez

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	215-227
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	80
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9623-z
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2014

Keywords

Deception
Godfrey-Smith
Sender–receiver games
Skyrms

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