TY - JOUR
T1 - Daunou’s Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities
AU - Barberà, Salvador
AU - Bossert, Walter
AU - Suzumura, Kotaro
N1 - Funding Information:
The paper was presented at Aoyama Gakuin University, Hitotsubashi University, the Second Padova Meeting on Economic Design and Institutions, the Third Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory in Granada, the University of Oslo and the Centre de Recherches Mathématiques Workshop on Voting Systems in Montreal. We thank a referee, Matthew Jackson, Michel Le Breton, Hervé Moulin, Amartya Sen, John Weymark and several seminar participants for comments and suggestions. Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grant ECO2017-83534-P and FEDER, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2017SGR–0711. Walter Bossert acknowledges financial support from the Fonds de Recherche sur la Société et la Culture of Québec for the project Recherches sur les fondations des mécanismes d’allocation des ressources (grant number 2017-SE-196424). Kotaro Suzumura acknowledges financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan for the Project on The Pursuit of Normative Economics with Extended Informational Bases, and the Reexamination of Its Doctrinal History (grant number 16H03599)
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2021/2
Y1 - 2021/2
N2 - Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos.: D71, D72.
AB - Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos.: D71, D72.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089727182&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-020-01276-w
DO - 10.1007/s00355-020-01276-w
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85089727182
VL - 56
SP - 259
EP - 289
IS - 2
ER -