TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperative production and efficiency
AU - Beviá, Carmen
AU - Corchón, Luis C.
PY - 2009/3/1
Y1 - 2009/3/1
N2 - We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
AB - We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
KW - Cooperative production
KW - Efficiency
KW - Incentives
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/59349105147
U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-4896
VL - 57
SP - 143
EP - 154
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
ER -