Cooperative production and efficiency

Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-154
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2009


  • Cooperative production
  • Efficiency
  • Incentives


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