Cooperative production and efficiency

Carmen Beviá; Luis C. Corchón

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006

Cooperative production and efficiency

Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	143-154
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	57
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2009

Keywords

Cooperative production
Efficiency
Incentives

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006

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AB - We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Cooperative production

KW - Efficiency

KW - Incentives

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M3 - Article

VL - 57

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EP - 154

ER -

Cooperative production and efficiency

Abstract

Keywords

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