The relationship and the tension between the logical and the rhetorical issues of the rational argumentation seems to achieve the inner logic of the hearing. Nevertheless, the place where this relation gives way to the full domain of persuasive elements is unexpressed and its border - after which we enter into the safest domains of logic - remains unknown and hidden. In this paper we identify an attractive candidate to describe this intermediate place between logic and rhetoric: that is the antilogy, a logical and rhetorical device exiled from the interest of historiography for a long time, and only recently reappeared in the logical and historical debate. We recall the Greek roots of the antilogy, in particular the sophistical one, to assess how, nowadays, such a structure can be a capable argumentation to stimulate the knowledge of some particular judicial and epistemological issues, such as the conflict of interpretations and the adversarial principle.
|Article number||doc. 214|
|Number of pages||1663|
|Publication status||Published - 2017|